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Constitutional Law-A HARD

CASE

MAKES

GOOD AND

BAD

LAw-Brown v. Firestone, 382 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1980).
On June 6, 1979, the Florida Legislature passed Senate Bill 1297,
commonly known as the General Appropriations Act.' A massive
work comprising over 1400 "line items," Senate Bill 1297 allocated
over fifteen billion dollars for the myriad functions of state government during the 1980-81 biennium.2 In his June 28th veto message,
Governor D. Robert Graham utilized his item veto power under
article III, section 8(a) of the Florida Constitution and struck
forty-one separate provisions.3 Leaders of the house of representatives then filed a mandamus suit against Secretary of State George
Firestone,' seeking an expungement of six of the vetoes from the
official records. The house leaders alleged the vetoes were a violation of article III, which prohibits exercise of the veto through
striking of language of qualification or restriction unless the relevant appropriation is also struck.'
The Supreme Court of Florida, entertaining the writ as a matter
of original jurisdiction, in Brown v. Firestone,6 held that (1) four of
the vetoes were valid because the provisions struck, despite being
phrased as provisos, actually constituted specific appropriations;
(2) a fifth veto was invalid (although the provision struck was held
void because not germane to the relevant appropriations); (3) a
sixth veto was invalid (although the provision struck was held void
because it constituted an attempt at substantive legislation within
the framework of the General Appropriations Act).
1. FLA. S. JOUR. 1033 (Reg. Sess. 1979); FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1311 (Reg. Sess. 1979).
2. See FLA. S. JOUR. 942-1033 (Reg. Sess. 1979) for the complete text of the bill. "Line
items" are separate appropriations for a specified purpose.
3. Letter from Governor D. Robert Graham to Secretary of State George Firestone (June
28, 1979) (on file with the Secretary of State's Office, Tallahassee, Fla.) [hereinafter cited as
Veto Message]. Some of the vetoes were technical corrections (e.g., Item 371B, striking appropriation to Eminent Scholars Program as duplicative because of the prior passage of Fla.
CS for HB 1689 (1979), Veto Message at 8) while others constituted exercises of pure gubernatorial discretion (e.g., Item 6H, striking four million dollars for acquisition of beach front
property in Destin, Fla. Veto Message at 18).
4. Brown v. Firestone, 382 So. 2d 654 (1980). J. Hyatt Brown (House Speaker), Herbert
Morgan (Chair of the House Appropriations Committee), S. Curtis Kiser (House Minority
Leader), and Ralph Haben Jr. (Speaker-Designate of the House) joined in the action. No
senate members joined in the action despite their involvement in the aborted negotiations
which preceded the suit. See Tallahassee Democrat, Oct. 25, 1979, § D at 3, col. 1.
5. Brown v. Firestone, 382 So. 2d 654 (1980). FLA. CONST. art. III, § 8(a) reads in relevant
part: "The governor may veto any specific appropriation in a general appropriation bill, but
may not veto any qualification or restriction without also vetoing the appropriation to which
it relates."
6. 382 So. 2d 654, 669-71 (1980).
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While upholding generally the right of the Governor to strike
any specific appropriation, the court modified existing case law in
its ruling that henceforth a governor may not raise the unconstitutionality of a stricken legislative qualification as a defense to a veto
challenge. 7 Finally, the court extended the special standing rule of
Department of Administration v. Hornes to recognize the right of
any citizen to litigate the validity of a gubernatorial veto of a legislative qualification.9
The purpose of this note is to explore the ramifications of Brown
v. Firestone regarding the exercise of the gubernatorial veto, especially the veto of legislative qualifications or restrictions. Throughout this note the terms "qualification," "restriction" and "proviso"
are used interchangeably.
Brown represents an attempt to redefine the veto power, an area
of inherent tension in a tripartite system of government. The antecedents to the clash between the legislative power to direct and the
executive power to forbid can be traced at least to the 1642 claim
of the Long Parliament of authority to enact legislation without
the approval of Charles 1.10 In colonial America the wilful use of
the veto power was assigned as one of the principal justifications
for revolution.1" It was only the disillusioning experience with the
Articles of Confederation which prompted the Framers of the
United States Constitution to confer a "qualified negative" upon
the President. 2
7. Id. at 669. Compare Brown with Lee v. Dowda, 19 So. 2d 570, 573 (Fla. 1944). In
Dowda, the court stated, "Our conclusion is that ... the inclusion of section 14 . . . was
unconstitutional and void. Therefore the plaintiffs in the court below were not and are not
injured by the Governor's veto of a section which was already void." See also Division of
Bond Fin. v. Smathers, 337 So. 2d 805, 807 (Fla. 1976) ("We need not consider the issue of
the constitutional validity of the Governor's veto because we hold the proviso to be
unconstitutional.").
8. 269 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 1972). In Home, the Florida Supreme Court recognized a limited
exception to the special injury requirement of Rickman v. Whitehurst, 74 So. 205, 207 (Fla.
1917), and held that a taxpayer had standing to contest the validity of provisions of the
General Appropriations Act on constitutional grounds relating solely to the taxing and
spending power. 269 So. 2d at 663.
9. 382 So. 2d at 671.

10.

See R. LUCE,

LEGISLATIVE PROBLEMS

140-41 (1935).

11. Note, Federal Legislation: The Item Veto in the American Constitutional System
25 GEO. L. J. 106, 107 (1936). The first two indictments of George III in the Declaration of
Independence read, "He has refused his Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and necessary
for the public good. He has forbidden his Governors to pass Laws of immediate and pressing
importance ....
" Declaration of Independence of the United States, reprinted in S.
BLOOM, FORMATION OF THE UNION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 530 (1940).
12. Note, supra note 11, at 108. See also Alexander Hamilton's plea for an executive
veto in THE FEDERALIST No. 73.
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The broader power to selectively strike items in an appropriation bill did not appear in an American constitution until the Civil
War.' 3 In the years following the Civil War, many states adopted
an item veto provision to control the legislative practice of attaching nongermane riders to appropriations 14 and to defeat what the
United States Supreme Court described as "the pernicious effect of
. . .'log-rolling'-by which, in order to secure the requisite majority to carry necessary and proper items of appropriation, unnecessary or even indefensible items are sometimes included."' 5
Despite the salutary purpose of the item veto power, its operation presented conceptual and practical difficulties for many state
courts. Executive discretion to selectively strike appropriations
duly enacted by the legislature places a governor in a position to
do much more than simply see that the laws are "faithfully executed"; rather, the executive
has a weighty influence in what dis6
bursements are made.'
Such enhanced authority must be circumscribed to prevent conflict with the general principles that all appropriations must be
made law' 7 and that lawmaking power is restricted to the legislature."8 If the item veto power were read broadly, a governor,
through artful deletions, could produce a bill different in amount
and effect from the one passed by the legislature.1 9 Thus, the em13. Art. I, § 7 of the permanent Constitution of the Confederate States read in relevant
part, "The President may approve any appropriation and disapprove any other appropria-

tion in the same bill."

PROVISIONAL AND PERMANENT CONSTITUTIONS OF THE CONFEDERATE

(1861) (out of print, available at the State Library of Florida, R.A. Gray Building,
Tallahassee, Fla.).
14. Beckman, The Item Veto Power of the Executive, 31 TEMP. L. Q. 27 (1957).
15. Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 299 U.S. 410, 415 (1937). The Florida Supreme
Court defined "logrolling" as:
a practice under which the legislature could include in a single act matters important to the people and desired by the Governor and other matters opposed by the
Governor or harmful to the welfare of the state, with the result that in order to
obtain the constructive or desired matter the Governor had to accept the unwanted portion.
Green v. Rawls, 122 So. 2d 10, 13 (Fla. 1960).
16. To enact a bill over a gubernatorial veto generally requires a two-thirds vote of each
house of the legislature. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 8(c). In reference to the veto power, the
Florida Supreme Court commented, "[Tihe veto power is capable of being expressed in precise numbers. It is represented by the difference between a majority vote and a two-thirds
vote." Amos v. Gunn, 94 So. 615, 631 (Fla. 1922).
17. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1(c), "No money shall be drawn from the treasury
except in pursuance of appropriation made by law."
18. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. III, § 1.
19. See, e.g., State ex rel. Sundby v. Adamany, 237 N.W.2d 910 (Wis. 1976), where the
effect of the Wisconsin governor's veto was to eliminate one of two alternate options proSTATES
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phasis in the leading cases is on the "negative" nature of the item
veto. A typical and oft-quoted statement of the principle appears
20
in State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick:
The power of partial veto is the power to disapprove. This is a
negative power, or a power to delete or destroy a part or item,
and is not a positive power, or a power to alter, enlarge or increase the effect of the remaining parts or items. It is not the
power to enact or create new legislation by selective deletions.
Thus, a partial veto must be so exercised that it eliminates or
destroys the whole of an item or part and does not distort the
legislative intent, and in effect create legislation inconsistent with
that enacted by the Legislature, by the careful striking of words,
phrases, clauses or sentences.

This type of separation-of-powers analysis has led a majority of
state courts to hold that a governor may not veto valid restrictions
which modify an appropriation. 21 Although this position effects a
doctrinal reconciliation between the governor's constitutional discretion and the legislature's fiscal authority, practical difficulties
are presented in answering two interrelated questions.
First, and almost ingenuously, what is an appropriation? The
question is variously phrased in terms of "items," or "parts," or
"items or portions" depending on the particular wording of the
constitution involved. 22 Briefly summarized, the definitions characterize an appropriation vulnerable to executive veto as a specific
sum for a specific purpose.2 Although comprehensive in itself, the
definition has been enlarged on occasion to include an invalid revided by the legislature to counties seeking a levy increase. See generally Harrington, The
Propriety of the Negative-The Governor's Partial Veto Authority, 60 MARQ. L.R. 865,
882-85 (1977).
20. 524 P.2d 975, 981 (N.M. 1974) (citations omitted). But see State ex rel. Sundby v.
Adamany, 237 N.W.2d 910 (Wis. 1976). The Sundby court stated:
Some argument is advanced that in the exercise of the item veto the governor
can negative what the legislature has done but not bring about an affirmative
change in the result intended by the legislature. We are not impressed by this
argued distinction. Every veto has both a negative and affirmative ring about it.
Id. at 918.
21. Among the recent cases so holding are Cenarrusa v. Andrus, 582 P.2d 1082 (Idaho
1978); Welden v. Ray, 229 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1975); Henry v. Edwards, 346 So. 2d 153 (La.
1977); Cason v. Bond, 495 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1973); State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 524
P.2d 975 (N.M. 1974); Jessen Assocs. Inc. v. Bullock, 531 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1976).
22. See, e.g., Welden v. Ray, 229 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1975); Cason v. Bond, 495 S.W.2d
385 (Mo. 1973); State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 524 P.2d 975 (N.M. 1974).
23. See generally 63 AM. JUR. 2d Public Funds § 46 (1962); 6 C.J.S. Appropriation12425 (1936); 25 FLA. JUR. Public Funds § 16 (1959).
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striction.24 This has been justified as a check on legislative
at25
tempts to circumvent the veto power by artful drafting.
The implications of this reasoning lead naturally to the second
question: What is a valid restriction of an appropriation? With a
few exceptions, the courts have not attempted to answer this question with precision. 26 In general, a valid restriction must be directory 27 and germane to the subject matter of the appropriation."
The last requirement is bound up with the constitutional prohibition found in many state charters providing that appropriation
bills may not contain provisions on any other subject.2 9 Where it is
held that the struck provision was unconstitutional, the propriety
of the governor's excision is often not reached.3 0 This may result
from the pragmatic assessment that one cannot be injured by the
veto of a void provision."
Florida first adopted an item veto provision as an amendment to
the Constitution of 1868.32 Case law development closely paralleled
the principles outlined above with one salient distinguishing feature. In Green v. Rawls,3 the Supreme Court of Florida construed
the item veto power in connection with the following legislative
appropriations:
24. See, e.g., Henry v. Edwards, 346 So. 2d 153, 158 (La. 1977).
25. Id. at 157-58.
26. See, e.g., Welden v. Ray, 229 N.W.2d 706, 710 (Iowa 1975). In In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 239 So. 2d 1, 10-11 (Fla. 1970), the court stated, "Such qualifications
and restrictions may not go to the extent of changing other substantive law, but they may
limit or qualify the use to which the moneys appropriated may be put and may specify
reasonable conditions precedent to their use ....
"
27. See, e.g., Welden v. Ray, 229 N.W.2d 706, 710 (Iowa 1975).
28. "[W]e have concluded, for reasons hereinafter stated, that the parts which were disapproved by the Governor were not provisos or conditions which were inseparably connected to the appropriation."State ex rel. Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. Henry, 260 N.W. 486, 490
(Wis. 1935) (emphasis added). See also Jessen Assocs. Inc. v. Bullock, 531 S.W.2d 593, 601
(Tex. 1976).
29. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. III, § 12, "Laws making appropriations ... shall contain
provisions on no other subject."
30. See, e.g., MacManus v. Love, 499 P.2d 609, 610-11 (Colo. 1972); Division of Bond
Fin. v. Smathers, 337 So. 2d 805, 807 (Fla. 1976).
31. Lee v. Dowda, 19 So. 2d 570, 573 (Fla. 1944).
32. The amendment provided:
The Governor shall have power to disapprove of any item or items of any bills
making appropriations of money embracing distinct items, and the part or parts of
the bill approved shall be the law, and the item or items of appropriation disapproved shall be void, unless repassed according to the rules and limitations prescribed for the passage of other bills over the Executive veto.
FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, § 18 (1885).
33. 122 So. 2d 10, 12 (Fla. 1960).
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Corrections, Division Of
a. General office
1. Salaries-including salary of
$12,000 per annum for the
director and salaries of 25
employees .................
2. Expenses ..................
3. Operating capital outlay ....
4. Special-discharge pay of inmates in an amount not exceeding $15 per inmate and
transportation at not exceeding $23 per inmate, as provided by law ..............
Subtotal (a)

23.

..................

Forestry, Florida Board of
a. Salaries-including salary of
$10,000 per annum for the
state forester and salaries of
890 employees in 1959/60 and
891 employees in 1960/61 ...
b. Expenses ..................
c. Operating capital outlay ....
Total of Item No. 23 .......

....

.

[Vol. 8:345

$143,580
53,739
12,816

$143,580
53,179
7,100

78,900

85,850

$289,035

$290,309

$1,014,794
952,013
466,704

$1,003,004
921,542
216,774

$2,433,311

$2,142,320'4

.050
051
052
053

The Governor of Florida vetoed the italicized portions of items
13(a)(1) (setting the salary of the director of the Division of Corrections at $12,000 per year) and 23(a) (setting the salary of the state
forester at $10,000 per year). 5 A suit was brought to enjoin the
state comptroller from issuing salary warrants to the director of
the Division of Corrections and the state forester in excess of the
limits specified in the stricken provisions. Circuit Court Judge
Hugh Taylor granted the injunction, holding that (1) the legislature could constitutionally submit to the Governor, as a single
item, the specific sum for the director's salary and the aggregate of
the rest of the Division's employees, and since the Governor's veto
went to but a part of an item, rather than the whole item, it was
ineffectual; 6 and that, (2) in the alternative, the veto was void because the effect of the veto would be to permit the increase of the
salaries of the specified individuals thus diverting monies from one
purpose (salaries of other Division employees) to another (salary of
the director) in contradiction of the legislative will and resulting in
34.
35.
36.
Brown

Id.
Id.
Petition for Extraordinary Writ [hereinafter cited as Petitioners' Brief] at 18-19,
v. Firestone, 382 So. 2d 654 (1980) (quoting Green v. Rawls, Trial Court Order).
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an executive amendment. 37

Upon review, the Florida Supreme Court reversed Judge Taylor
and held that the Governor could validly strike "items within
items.

' 38

Most interestingly, the court went on to hold that the

overall salary appropriation was not reduced by the amount vetoed.39 The court's reasoning on this point was obscure and the
precedents it relied on were of doubtful relevancy.' 0 No other state
37.

As Judge Taylor stated:
[T]here is another, and a more compelling reason for holding the veto invalid.
The power of the Governor to disapprove items of an appropriation bill is intended as a corollary to his power to veto all of other bills. It is the power to
annul, to render invalid, to make void that "item" of appropriation which is disapproved. By common understanding, as well as by technical usage, the power to
veto an appropriation means the power to prevent the expenditure of a certain
part of the public funds for a certain purpose. To give effect to the veto in this
case would not destroy any appropriation or render invalid any contemplated expenditure of public money. The purpose of the veto as stated by the Governor,
and the practical operation contemplated, is that the amount of money to be expended for the salary of the designated public servant will be increased. Total
state expenditures will be unchanged, but the amount of increased compensation
to be given the Director of the Division of Corrections will be reflected in a reduction of the amounts that can be made available for other employees of this department. In practical operation the action of the Governor is not to veto any item of
the appropriation bill. It is to amend the bill-to take money which the Legislature said should be used for one purpose and use it for another-to use money
appropriated by the Legislature for the payment of 25 employees (other than the
Director) for the purpose of increasing the salary of the Director beyond that
which the Legislature expressly fixed as the amount of his salary. This is not a
proper function of the veto power.
Petitioners' Brief at 19 (quoting Green v. Rawls, Trial Court Order).
38. 122 So. 2d at 16.
39. The court stated:
Although the Governor had the power to strike out the whole appropriations for
salaries for the departments he had no authority, under the form in which the
appropriations bill was submitted to him, to reduce the amount of the appropriations for salaries and his veto of the specific items within the general items of
salary did not have this effect. In each case the appropriation for salaries, as a
general item, remains undiminished as the part of the law approved by the
Governor.
Id. at 18.
40. One possible basis for the court's decision would be a finding that the legislature
evinced an intention to appropriate the total sum to the division regardless of the fate of the
lesser included figure. This view was the basis of Reardon v. Riley, 76 P.2d 101 (Cal. 1938),
which the Florida Supreme Court labeled as "directly in point" in the Rawls decision. 122
So. 2d at 18. The relevance of Reardon, however, is problematic due to the complicated
situation in that case. In Reardon, the Governor of California struck specific lesser included
appropriations of $328,000 and $20,000 from a larger lump sum. 76 P.2d at 102. He also
separately reduced the lump sum under his constitutional power to "reduce or eliminate"
but only by the amount of $228,000 rather than $348,000 (the aggregate of the struck items).
Id. The court in Reardon viewed the vetoes and reduction as separate exercises of gubernatorial power and relied on the action of the legislature which mounted separate challenges to
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court has specifically relied on Rawls to reach a similar result."1
The same Judge Taylor who was overruled in Rawls became a
member of the Constitutional Revision Commission which met in
1965-66 to revise the 1865 Florida Constitution.' That body suggested a revision of article IV, section 18"" to provide for a gubernatorial veto of any "specific appropriation" in a general appropriation bill." Transcripts of the Commission's deliberations indicate
that the revision was drawn with the intent to overturn the Rawls
decision.'8
the vetoes and the reduction. Id. at 103. Whatever the strength of the logic of the Reardon
holding, it was based on circumstances which did not appear in Rawls.
41. West Virginia has reached an analogous position but solely under that state supreme
court's interpretation of West Virginia's Modern Budget Amendment, W. VA. CONST. art.
VI, § 51 (1968), which contemplates an executive rather that legislative budget. See State ex
rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship, 207 S.E.2d 421, 435 (W. Va. 1971).
42. 382 So. 2d at 666-67.
43. See note 32 supra.
44. 2 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 120 (Dec. 5, 1966) (remarks of Chairman Smith).
45. The following portion of the transcript provides:
Mr. O'Neill: Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission, as you will recall, Mr. Turlington's debate earlier this morning, he was concerned about the
legislative intent, which had been generally construed by members of the legislature as being an intent of the legislature and as being a general statute, equal and
recognized by the courts as a part of the general law.
As you will recall, in the case of Green v. Rawls, which came out of the Supreme
Court of Florida on June 22nd of 1960, there was established in the appropriations
bill the question of salary. The governor sought to veto a portion of the language
that was in the appropriations bill. What this particular amendment is designed to
do, and which I hope and, suggest that it does do, says simply to the governor, the
governor can veto an item in the appropriations bill, but he cannot veto such
items as may express to the budget commissionMr. [Judge Hugh] Taylor: Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. O'Neill: In a moment I will, Your Honor.-cannot veto an expression of
the legislature, which as far as I am concerned, after 10 years' experience, have
always thought that an expression of the legislature expressing the will of the people, since it was by a majority vote in that group elected by all the people, was
what the executive should carry out, the intent of the legislature.
Now, as I recall, and so I am informed, that legislative intent is a word that has
been used by the courts of this state to determine what the intent was where there
was a conflict between a possibility of what the law said and what the legislature
intended. That is my understanding of the historical reasoning for legislative intent, that the courts would suggest to themselves that they would seek the legislative intent and find out wherever they could what the intent of the legislature was,
and then they would make their decision based upon what the law said and what
the language said, and make it come into complete agreement with the legislative
intent.
Now, if you subscribe to that theory, and as Mr. Turlington so well put it this
morning, the language following a specific item in appropriations was an expression of the legislature which should be treated as a portion of the general law, and
that the governor had no authority to veto that item. He had a right, however, to
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Soon after the Commission's report in 1967, Governor Claude
Kirk vetoed the 1968-69 General Appropriations Act.4 Efforts by
the largely Democratic legislature to override the veto failed, and
Kirk's own more modest proposal was accepted.47 Governor Kirk
then struck certain proviso language in the enacted bill." These
events were doubtless fresh in the minds of legislators on the Joint
Legislative Committee on Constitutional Revision, which added a
specific prohibition in 1967 against the striking of qualifications to
the final draft of the revised article IV, section 18 (now article I1,
section 8(a)). 4a
veto an individual line item or a monetary amount.
So what my amendment simply does is follow the philosophy as expressed by
Mr. Turlington that the governor may veto any specific appropriations, but he
could not veto the intent of the legislature, or as it was expressed in the appropriations bill.
2 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 121-23 (Dec. 5, 1966).
46.

FLA. S.

JOUR.

1188 (Reg. Sess. 1967).

47. Id. at 1188-89.
48. The Governor vetoed restrictions following items 441 and 453 which read,
respectively:
Provided the total amount expended from this appropriation for administration
and distribution to counties during this biennium shall not exceed the total
amount collected from the 50 cents per year levied for this purpose upon drivers.
Provided that the basic units shall be based on one unit for each 16 students in
ADA at a junior college for the first 420 students and one unit for each 20 students in ADA for all over 420 students.
See FLA. S. JOUR. 1188, 1192 (Reg. Sess. 1967).
49. See note 5 supra. The following transcript of the joint committee's deliberations is
illustrative:
Sen. Jack Mathews: The floor is clear and open and Rep. Sessums moves that
an amendment to Section 8, subparagraph (a) be approved to read as follows:
Strike the period at the end of the subsection and insert in lieu thereof a comma,
"but may not veto any qualification or restriction without also vetoing the appropriation to which it relates." Is that correct? Is there discussion? If not, then Representative Reed?
Rep. Don Reed: Will Mr. Sessums yield to a question?
Sen. Mathews: He yields.
Rep. Reed: Rep. Sessums, if, let's say, the higher education bill within the
appropriation itself, to the University of Florida and Florida Atlantic University, 1
million dollars for each of two given years . . . could the governor in your language veto the words Florida Atlantic University?
Rep. Terrell Sessums: In my opinion this language would prevent that and
would require that he would then veto part of the qualification to the appropriation (interruption) or restrictions. He would then also have to veto the specific
thing appropriated.
Rep. Reed: Do you feel that those two words "qualification or restriction"
would cover any provisions in the general appropriations act pertaining to a specific appropriation.
Rep. Sessums: I believe it was the opinion of the subcommittee that as we
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After Kirk's troubled tenure, ° Governor Reubin Askew also
struck provisions of general appropriations acts which arguably
constituted language of qualification or restriction, but was never
challenged by the legislature.51 Thus Brown represented the first
case in which the issue of the boundary between the authority of
the Governor and the authority of the legislature under article III,
section 8(a) of the 1968 Florida Constitution was squarely met.
After detailing the procedural history of the case,"2 Justice Sunberg, speaking for a unanimous court, addressed the standing of
the petitioners.58 In Florida, a citizen's standing to enjoin an unauthorized expenditure of public funds has been limited by a requirement that the citizen must allege special injury flowing from the
expenditures. 5 4 The court in 1972, however, had recognized a limited exception to this rule where a citizen challenged provisions of
an appropriations act as violative of specific constitutional limitations on the legislature's taxing and spending power.8 Because of
discussed this particular point, we started out with about four adjectives rather
than the two as you see here, it was the feeling of the subcommittee that the word
"qualifications" was broad enough and inclusive enough to properly cover the language that did qualify the appropriation.
Fla. Joint Legislative Committee on Constitutional Revision, tape recording of proceedings
(Oct. 10, 1967) (available at Florida Supreme Court Library), quoted in Petitioners' Brief at
22-23.
50. Governor Kirk again vetoed the General Appropriations Act in 1970, but the legislature overrode his veto. See Fla. HB 5210 (1970). Governor Kirk then propounded a request
for an advisory opinion to the Florida Supreme Court on the general constitutionality of the
act. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 239 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1970). The court, perhaps concerned that the advisory opinion not become a vehicle of general review, declined to
analyze all the provisions of the act and upheld it against a general attack. Id. at 11. The
court historically has avoided general inquires. See, e.g., In re Executive Communication, 6
So. 925 (Fla. 1887).
51. See Tallahassee Democrat, Dec. 16, 1979, § D at 12, col. 4. See also Division of Bond
Fin. v. Smathers, 337 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 1976). In that case, Governor Askew vetoed a restriction in the 1976 General Appropriations Act partially because he viewed it as unconstitutional. The Governor and the Cabinet then authorized the Division of Bond Finance to
initiate proceedings to challenge the constitutionality of the proviso or, alternatively, to validate the Governor's action. The supreme court held the provision unconstitutional but did
not pass on the validity of the Governor's action. Id. at 806-07.
52. Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus requiring the secretary of state to expunge
the vetoes and an order restraining the comptroller from disbursing funds based on the
vetoes. The Cabinet officers filed notices that they considered themselves nominal parties
and declined to brief or argue the merits of the case. Governor Graham was added as party
respondent on November 1, 1979. 382 So. 2d at 657.
53. Id. at 662. Justice Adkins filed a special concurrence. Id. at 672.
54. Rickman v. Whitehurst, 74 So. 204, 207 (Fla. 1917).
55. Horne, 269 So. 2d at 662. The Horne court made reference to standing to sue as
legislators, "[Wie believe that members of that august body [the Florida Senate] would
agree that they should not as legislators have a 'second shot' before the judiciary on legisla-
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the implications of the Brown dispute regarding the legislature's
taxing and spending power, the court held that the petitioners had
standing to challenge the vetoes. 6 The court then exercised its discretion to accept original jurisdiction of the writ because of the
danger that the functions of government would be adversely af7
fected without an immediate determination.5
Before passing on the particular vetoes involved, the court commented on the "peculiar posture" of the case.58 The legislators alleged the unconstitutionality of the vetoes, whereas the Governor
defended two of the vetoes as excisions of provisions which were
unconstitutional in a general appropriations act. Acknowledging
that "in some instances the outcome of the case will be decided by
which side of the issue is focused upon first," the court set as its
task "to define and delimit the relationship between the gubernatorial veto power and the legislature's authority to enact general
appropriation law." 59
While recognizing the legislature's constitutional right to qualify
and restrict appropriations, the court emphasized that this power
was necessarily limited by the constitutional mandate, under article III, section 12, that laws making appropriation for current expenses shall contain provisions on no other subject.6 0 The legislature is thus precluded from "logrolling" and changing or amending
substantive legislation in a general appropriations act.6 ' The court
stated that article III, section 12 mandates a germanity test which:
will countenance a qualification or restriction only if it directly
tive decisions, having first 'missed' in their legislative forum." Id. at 660. The Brown court
ignored the petitioners' allegation of standing as legislators in accord with the reasoning of
the Home decision. 382 So. 2d at 662.
56. Id. The different situations, however, do not seem to "compel" a symmetrical result.
In both Horne and the case it relied on, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), taxpayers attacked alleged unconstitutional expenditures. Arguably, the interest involved is the integrity of the fisc whereas when the executive strikes an appropriation item the fisc is not
diminshed. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae at 4, Brown v. Firestone, 382 So. 2d 654 (1980).
57. 382 So. 2d at 662.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 12 provides, "Laws making appropriations for salaries of
public officers and other current expenses of the state shall contain provisions on no other
subject." This provision has appeared in identical language in every Florida Constitution
since 1868 and has been held to refer specifically to general appropriations acts. See Amos v.
Moseley, 77 So. 619, 623 (Fla. 1917).
61. 382 So. 2d at 662. The legislature, however, may allocate funds for a previously authorized purpose in amounts different from those previously allocated. See Thomas v.
Askew, 270 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 1972).
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and rationally relates to the purpose of an appropriation and,
indeed, if the qualification or restriction is a major motivating
factor behind enactment of the appropriation. That is to say, has
the legislature in the appropriations process determined that the
appropriation is worthwhile or advisable only if contingent upon
a certain event or fact, or is the qualification or restriction being
used merely as a device to6 further
a legislative objective unrelated
2
to the fund appropriated?
Turning to the Governor's veto power, the court implicitly recognized that Green v. Rawls was erroneous insofar as it allowed the
Govenor to veto legislative intent but retain the appropriation
wedded to that intent. Emphasizing that the veto power is a negative power, the court stated that, under the holding in Rawls,
"Legislative intent was not nullified, it was altered."6 8 The court
went on to hold that the intent of the framers of article III, section
8(a) and the 1968 Constitution, inferred from the minutes of the
Revision Commission, was to supersede Green v. Rawls and to require the Governor to forsake the relevant funds whenever legislative intent is negated. 4
The court completed its discussion of the scope of the veto
power with two important determinations. First, the court defined
"specific appropriation" for purposes of article III, section 8(a) as
the smallest identifiable sum, for a specified purpose, to which a
qualification can be said to directly and logically relate. 6 The
practical effect of such a definition, the court pointed out, is to
prevent the legislature from qualifying an appropriation with a
smaller included appropriation so as to insulate the smaller sum
from the item veto. 6 Second, the court held that although the veto
is an exercise of pure gubernatorial discretion, it must be exercised
in a constitutional manner. The specific prohibition of article III,
section 8(a) bars the Governor from striking a qualifying provision
62. 382 So. 2d at 664. (emphasis added). This test arguably sets a lower standard than
the almost result oriented test used in Dickinson v. Stone, 251 So. 2d 268, 274 (Fla. 1971):
The important matter of providing appropriation for the operation of the government of the State of Florida should not be prejudiced by the injection into the
appropriation of any other subjects, regardless of their inherent merits or demerits, unless such other subjects are so relevent to, interwoven with, and interdependent upon the appropriationsso as to jointly constitute a complete legislative expression on the subject. (emphasis added).
63. 382 So. 2d at 666-67.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 668.
66. Id.
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without also striking the related appropriation, regardless of the
Governor's view of the constitutionality of the provision involved:
"The governor cannot act unconstitutionally to remedy a perceived
'67
unconstitutional act of the legislature.
In passing on the validity of Governor Graham's six vetoes, the
court depended on essentially three grounds. First, the proviso following item 1131 purported to authorize the Bureau of the Uniform Commercial Code to draw additional monies from the deficiency fund upon a demonstration of additional workload and
approval of the Department of Administration." The court held
that the procedure outlined in the proviso directly contravened
section 216.231(1), Florida Statutes,6 9 which permits the disbursement of deficiency funds only upon the approval of the Governor
70
and three other members of the Administration Commission.
While agreeing that the proviso constituted an invalid attempt
under article III, section 12 to amend substantive law in the General Appropriations Act, the court held that the Governor's action
in striking the proviso was also invalid. As the proviso purportedly
authorized only a contingent transfer of money from the deficiency
67.
68.

Id.
Id. at 659. Item 1131 reads as follows:
Corporations, Division of
1131 Salaries and Benefits

Provided, that in addition to the funds appropriated in Item 1131 for salaries and
benefits for the Bureau of Uniform Commercial Code, if HB 1643 or SB 1256 is
enacted into law, the Bureau of Uniform Commercial Code is specifically authorized to utilize up to $100,000 of the deficiency fund upon approval of the Department of Administration. Such deficiency funds may be used to supplement the
positions provided by this bill and shall be approved by the Department of Administration, upon a showing of need by the director of the Division of Corporations based upon the following schedule: For every additional 5,000 uniform commercial code documents filed in fiscal year 1980-81 above those documents filed in
fiscal year 1979-80, one additional position.
FLA. S. JOUR. 1012-13 (Reg. Sess. 1979).
69. (1979).
70. 382 So. 2d at 669. FLA. STAT. § 216.231(1) (1979) provides:
Any appropriation to the department which is classified as "emergency," or "deficiency," may be released only with the approval of the Governor and three other
members of the Administration Commission. The state agency desiring the use of
any such appropriation shall submit to the department application therefor in
writing setting forth the facts from which the alleged need arises. The commission
shall, at a public hearing, review such application promptly and approve or disapprove the same as the circumstances may warrant. All actions of the commission
shall be reported to the legislative appropriation committees, and the committees
may advise the commission relative to the release of such funds. (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted).
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fund, it did not constitute a specific appropriation susceptible to
1
gubernatorial veto.7
Second, the proviso relating to Glades Correctional Institution
purportedly qualified the funding of salaries, expenses, and capital
outlay for this major Florida penal institution upon the reduction
of the inmate population.7 2 The court found the qualification to be
invalid because it did not relate to the subject of the appropriation.7 Similarly, the Governor's veto was held to be ineffectual because the proviso identified no fund which could be said to consti' 4
tute a "specific appropriation."
Finally, the court examined the four provisos which appeared to
qualify lump sums with lesser included appropriations . 7 The petitioners argued that the lesser figures constituted valid qualifications on the whole appropriation in that they reflected a comprehensive legislative intent which would demand reevaluation if
71. 382 So. 2d at 669.
72. Id. at 657. The original proviso relating to Glades Correctional Institution reads as
follows:
Major Institutions
Provided that the department shall phase back the inmate count at Glades
-Correctional Institution to the design capacity of 609 inmates prior to June
30, 1980. Except, however, that should the statewide inmate population exceed maximum capacity then Glades Correctional Institution may exceed
design capacity. [vetoed].
250

Salaries and Benefits Positions
From General Revenue Fund ......
From Correctional Work Programs
Trust Fund ...................
From Grants and Donations Trust
Fund .........................
From Operating Trust Fund ......

FLA. S. JOUR.

6,288
72,614,708

6,459
74,029,307

3,310,676

3,343,857

967,100
84,675

969,465
84,700

956-57 (Reg. Sess. 1979).

73. 382 So. 2d at 669. The Governor also advanced the argument that the proviso contravened the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution as the Florida penal system
was under a federal district court order to remedy eighth amendment violations including
overcrowding. Brief of Governor Graham at 21, Brown v. Firestone, 382 So. 2d 654 (1980).
See Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Fla. 1975), affd, 525 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir.
1976). The design capacity specified in the proviso for Glades Correctional Institution differs from the one given in the final order of the district court. Costello v. Wainwright, No.
72-109-Civ-J-S, No. 72-94-Civ-J-S (M.D. Fla. Feb. 11, 1980) (order approving settlement
agreement). Arguably, a state legislature does not have the authority to interfere with the
equity jurisdiction of a federal district court. See generally United States v. Peters, 9 U.S.
(5 Cranch) 115, 136 (1809).
74. 382 So. 2d at 669.
75. Id. at 669-70. The four provisos read as follows:

1980]

CASE NOTES

severed. 7 1 While accepting the germanity of the qualifications to

OC

Fixed Capital Outlay
To the Board of Regents of the State
University System From Public
Education Capital Outlay and
Debt Service Trust Fund .......

Item
University of South Florida Medical
Center...
FLA. S. JOUR.

6G

30,936,021

28,730,637

Fiscal Year
1979-1980

Fiscal Year
1980-1981

8,000,000

6,250,000

957 (Reg. Sea. 1979).

Fixed Capital Outlay
Park Development
From Land Acquisition
Trust Fund .....................

Provided, however, from funds appropriated in item 6G the following park
projects for 1979-80 totaling $2,020,000, Cedar Key, Lake Rousseau, Manatee
Springs, Kingsley Plantation, Wekiwa Springs, Bill Baggs, Hugh Taylor and the
Barnacle, shall be considered as first priority projects by the Department of Natural Resources.
FLA. S. JOUR. 1027 (Reg. Seas. 1979).
OB

Fixed Capital Outlay to Boards of Trustees of the
Community Colleges
From Public Education
Capital Outlay and
Debt Service Trust Fund .........

.003

27,192,240

2,573,035

From the cumulative total allocated to the Board of Trustees of the 28 community
colleges there is to be provided $2,500,000 in the 1979-80 fiscal year and
$2,500,000 in the 1980-81 fiscal year for library books and/or scientific and technical equipment. These funds shall be allocated based on the FTE's assigned to
each college.
FLA. S. JoUR. 1028 (Reg. Seas. 1979).
382
Expenses
From General Revenue Fund ........
4,514,259
4,681,139
From Medical CenterProfessional Medical
Liability Self Insurance Trust Fund
168,500
168,500
From Operation and Maintenance
Trust Fund .....................
609,049
658,621
From the cumulative total allocated to the Board of Regents of the state university system $10,000,000 shall be provided in the 1979-80 fiscal year and
$10,000,000 shall be provided in the 1980-81 fiscal year for library books.
FLA. S. JOUR. 1028-29 (Reg. Seas. 1979).
76. Petitioners' Reply Brief at 12-13, Brown v. Firestone, 382 So. 2d 654 (1980). The
petitioners' argument did not essentially differ from the position put forth by the legislators
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the appropriations, the court reasoned that since the qualifications
most rationally and directly related to figures contained within
their own terms, the provisos in each instance constituted "specific
appropriations" and could be reached by veto. 7 The vetoes eliminated the funds involved and the overall appropriations were reduced accordingly.7 8
The court found that two of the above four provisos presented
an additional issue. The determination of the validity of items OB
(allocating five million dollars over the biennium for library books
and/or scientific and technical equipment for the community college system) and OC (allocating twenty million dollars over the biennium for library books) involved the proper construction of the
phrase "capital project" as that term is used in article XII, section
9(a)(2) of the Florida Constitution.7 9 Governor Graham contended
that since expenditures for books and equipment are of an operating nature, they violate section 9(a)(2)'s restriction on the use of
Public Education Capital Outlay and Debt Service Trust Fund
(PECO) funds for capital projects authorized by the legislature.8 0
Petitioners urged that, since the term "capital project" is not defined in the article, the legislative construction as expressed in sec82
tion 235.011(10), Florida Statutes," is entitled to great weight.
in People ex rel. State Board of Agriculture v. Brady, 115 N.E. 204 (Ill.. 1917). The legislature in that case appropriated a lump sum followed by various subdivisions specifying the
expenditure of the sum in specific amounts for specific purposes. The Illinois Supreme
Court rejected the view that the subdivisions constituted qualifications upon the lump sum
and held that, to prevent an evasion of the gubernatorial veto, each subdivision was deemed
an "item" subject to veto. Id. at 207.
77. 382 So. 2d at 669-71.
78. Id.
79. Section 9(a)(2) commits the revenues derived from collection of the gross receipts tax
on utilities to the Public Education Capital Outlay and Debt Service Trust Fund until the
year 2025. The State Board of Education is authorized to issue full faith and credit bonds to
finance or refinance any capital project authorized by the legislature. Monies in the trust
fund are required to be used: first, for payment of principal and interest on existing bonds;
second, for deposit into any required reserve funds; and third, for direct payment of cost of
any capital project for the state educational system. FLA. CONST. art. XII, § 9(a)(2).
80. Brief of Governor Graham at 25-26.
81. (1979). The statute provides that, "'Capital project' means sums of money appropriated to the Public Education Capital Outlay and Debt Service Trust Fund for the state
system of public education."
Contrast the vagueness of this definition with the view of a commentator who was arguing
for a revision of another provision of the 1968 constitution to specify that full faith and
credit bonds were only to be used to finance fixed capital outlay projects:
This revision is intended to make clear that long-term bonded indebtedness
should be incurred only to finance long-term improvements with a useful life that
will not be substantially less than the amortization period of the debt. Otherwise,
"capital projects" could be construed to include so-called "operating capital out-
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The court accepted the asserted legislative latitude in defining capital project for purposes of PECO expenditures, stating that a relatively contemporaneous construction of the constitution by the legislature is entitled to a strong presumption of correctness.e"
In closing, Justice Sundberg stated that the Florida Supreme
Court was unwilling to act as a referee on a biennial basis between
the executive and legislative branches over the appropriations
act. 4 To further strengthen the constitutional prohibition of article III, section 8(a), the court recognized the right of any citizen
taxpayer to challenge the constitutionality of a gubernatorial veto
lay" items with a relatively short useful life, while the bonds issued to finance
such "projects" could remain outstanding long after the items acquired with the
proceeds had been discarded. This revision is consistent with the philosophy that
long-term debt should not be incurred to fund recurring expenditures w.:Ch in
turn cause pyramiding principal and interest obligations. Experiences in other
states have indicated that there is just a short step to disaster when current expenses are included in an entity's capital budget.
Greenfield, Flexibility and Fiscal Conservatism:Provisions of the 1978 ConstitutionalRevision Relating to Bond Financing,6 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 821, 824 (1978) (footnotes ommitted).
Despite the fact that article XII, § 9(a)(2) seems flawed by the same lack of specificity, no
substantive changes to it were proposed by the 1978 Constitutional Revision Commission.
Id. at 837.
82. Petitioners' Reply Brief at 16-17.
83. 382 So. 2d at 670-71 (citing Greater Loretta Improvement Ass'n v. State ex rel.
Boone, 234 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1970)). The court purported to find further support in two
administrative definitions of "capital outlay." Section 6-A2.205 of the Florida Administrative Code, enumerates the uses to which school bond revenues may be applied. All of the
examples given are major long-term projects such as site acquisition and improvement, new
construction, remodeling and renovation, and replacement of defective roofs. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 6A-2.205(1), (2), (4), (6), (8). The subsection the court directly relied on relates
to new buildings and additions and provides that such projects may be equipped and furnished through bond revenues. FLA. ADMIN. CODE. R. 6A-2.205(5). The equipment items
purchased must have a life expectancy of one year or more. FLA. ADMIN. CODE. R. 6A2.205(5)(a). The court took this last provision as a definition of capital outlay, 382 So. 2d at
671, failing to appreciate the distinction between equipping a new building or addition and
purchasing equipment for an existing structure. A new laboratory, for example, is just a
building until equipped for its intended use. The situation is different when purchase of
replacement equipment is contemplated. In fact, subsection (c) of the section the court relied on provides that "[e]quipment acquired for an addition shall be restricted to the addition." FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 6A-2.205(5)(c). In like manner, the other administrative source
the court relied on classifies acquisition of library books for existing libraries as a replacement cost while it views the acquisition of books for new libraries as a capital outlay. Account Numbers 610 and 810, Financial and Program Cost Accounting and Reporting for
Florida Schools at 4-2 and 4-3 (a manual available from the Educational Products Division,
Department of Education, Collins Building, Tallahassee, Fla.).
The legislative provisos in the Brown suit were general appropriations to the community
college and university system and not tied to any new construction. See Items OB and OC,
note 75 supra. Thus, under the administrative sources the court relied on, the books and
equipment would be viewed as replacement items rather than capital outlay.
84. 382 So. 2d at 671.
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of a qualification or restriction "even if the qualificationor restric' 5 In such an action, the Govertion is clearly unconstitutional."
nor's veto will be invalidated unless it can be demonstrated that
the provision stricken by veto constituted a specific appropriation.86 In addition, the court reaffirmed the holding of Horne establishing the standing of any citizen to challenge the constitutionality of provisions of the General Appropriations Act via a suit for
87
declaratory judgement.
Brown presents a careful reclarification of the power of each of
the coequal branches. The legislature may set valid conditions on
the use of appropriated money with the assurance that the funds
may not be spent in disregard of the restrictions. The Governor
may block any specific expenditure even if it is phrased as qualifying a larger sum. Excesses of either branch may be challenged by
any citizen. The judiciary reasserted its traditional position as sole
constitutional arbiter by preventing the Governor from raising the
unconstitutionality of a stricken provision as a defense to a veto
challenge. While Brown cannot be faulted as a general restatement,
its less conspicuous aspects are both disturbing and raise doubts as
to whether the case will fully stabilize the inherent tension between the power to appropriate and the power to forbid.
Disturbing in a fiscal sense is the court's acceptance of an openended legislative definition of "capital project" in light of the
demonstrated legislative tendency to use PECO bond revenues in a
diseconomic fashion. 8 Although a legislative interpretation is entitled to great weight, it is an elementary tenet of constitutional construction that a provision should be read in light of the circumstances it was designed to address and the evils it was intended to
remedy.8 9 Reason demands that long-term debt not be incurred for
85. Id. (emphasis in original).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Although outside the direct scope of this comment, it is interesting to note that Governor Graham also struck a legislative appropriation of $2,600,000 million from PECO funds
to local school districts for the purchase of buses. This veto was not challenged despite its
inclusion in the negotiations which preceded the lawsuit. See Tallahassee Democrat, Oct. 25,
1979, § D at 3, col. 1 & 2. Whereas some books may last thirty years, laboratory equipment
would almost surely be obsolete and/or worn out well before the retirement of the bonds
which funded its purchase. It would be the rare school bus which would be serviceable ten
years after its purchase.
89. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). Neither side in Brown briefed
the admittedly sparse legislative history of article XII, section 9(a). The house hearing on
the amendment never focused on a definition of "capital project"; however, all the specific
examples used in the discussion are fixed long-term projects. The following exchange be-
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short-term benefits and the elaborate prohibitions and procedures
specified in article XII, section 9(a) of the Florida Constitution
bear witness to the circumspection and restraint with which PECO
funds should be used.
Related to the foregoing, and equally as troublesome, is the
court's tacit acceptance of the legislative use of the General Appropriations Act as a vehicle for authorizing capital projects despite
the clear mandate of article III, section 12 that the act be restricted to salaries and other current expenses.90 At oral argument,
counsel for the house leaders mentioned in passing that such a
practice expanded the power of the Governor since a separate bill
making several PECO appropriations would not be vulnerable to
the item veto."' Whatever the intrinsic merits of such a procedure,
it can only be validly adopted by a vote of the people.
Finally, the court's streamlined procedure may not encompass
all the various forms litigation in this area may take in the future.
Faced with a facially unconstitutional but germane qualification, a
chief executive must make an unenviable choice between following
the prohibition of article III, section 8(a) or the executive's oath to
uphold the constitutions of the state and nation.'2 A governor in
such a situation could approve the bill but immediately institute
proceedings to test the validity of the objectionable provision.9
tween Representative William Rish and Representative Ralph Turlington (now Commis-

sioner of Education) is illustrative.
Rish: Mr. (Arnold) Greenfield, I think what he may be getting at is that we
might decide to build roads and courthouses and capitols with this money in ten
years. Is that what

. .

. (sound of door closing).

Turlington: Well. . .let me make, let me respond to that. That amendment
as offered by Mr. Forbes would not transfer any of that money to roads or anything else because the money would still be 100% earmarked for purposes of construction of schools, for kindergarten through higher education.
Fla. H.R., Committee on Finance and Taxation, tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 24,
1974) (hearing on Fla. CS for HJR 2289 § 2984).
90. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 12. Infairness, it must be pointed out that the Governor did
not attack the PECO provisos as being invalidly included in the general appropriations and
the court may have hesitated to decide an unbriefed issue. Nevertheless it is logically incongruous to define "capital project" when the question is presented in the context of a general
appropriations act.
91. Informal transcript of a tape of oral arguments, (Dec. 13, 1979) (Brown v. Firestone,
382 So. 2d 654 (1980)). (Available in the Florida Supreme Court Library).
92. FLA. CONST. art. IV § (1)(a) provides: "He [the Governor] shall take care that the
laws be faithfully executed .... .. In his special concurrence, Justice Adkins argued that
the Governor should be able to raise the unconstitutionality of a struck proviso as a threshold issue. 382 So. 2d at 672.
93. Under FLA. CONST. art IV, § l(b), the Governor "may initiate judicial proceedings in
the name of the state against any executive or administrative state, county, or municipal
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The issue may be of such significance to the fiscal well-being of the
state as to force the supreme court to take original jurisdiction.
Alternatively, a future chief executive may veto an unconstitutional provision in a manner prohibited by article III, section 8(a)
and join the secretary of state as a defendant in any later veto
challenges. Even if the Governor will not be heard to defend unconstitutional acts on the basis of the unconstitutionality of the
stricken provision, the Secretary as official recordkeeper and a
party with "clean hands" would be in a position to oppose the inclusion of provisions of doubtful validity in the annals of the state.
A combination of the above two scenarios is possible. A governor
faced with a challenge to a veto action may initiate proceedings
attacking the constitutionality of the stricken provision and, in the
interest of judicial economy, move to consolidate the declaratory
judgement suits. Thus, in a number of ways, the issue of the unconstitutionality of a stricken provision as defense to a veto challenge may rise again, phoenixlike.
Despite the above criticisms, Brown v. Firestone presents a
much needed synthesis of Florida law on the item veto. The opinion's more regrettable aspects demonstrate the necessity for
greater public scrutiny of the important, but often neglected, appropriations process.
DAVID GLATTHORN

officer to enfore compliance with any duty or restrain any unauthorized act."

